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[47 C.2d

and for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion
in that case, I ·would affirm the judgment of the trial court
here.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February
19, 1957. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L.A. No. 24226.

In Bank.

Jan. 25, 1957.]

HAYWARD LUMBER AND INVESTMENT COMPANY
(a Corporation), Appellant, v. E. W. BISCAILUZ et al.,
Respondents.
[1] Process-Definition.-An order of court purporting to release an attachment "as to all property except $2,000.00 in
bank account" comes within the definition of "process" in Gov.
Code, § 26660, as including all "orders of courts of justice,"
or judicial officers.
[2] Sheriffs- Liability. -Generally, a sheriff assuming to act
virtute officii warrants that he is possessed of such authority
and, if not authorized, is liable to persons who suffer damage
from steps taken under the belief that he was.
[3] !d.-Service of Process.-In the service of process the sheriff
is responsible only for unreasonably or not reasonably executing it; he must act with reasonable diligence, and reasonable
diligence depends on the particular facts.
[4] !d.-Liability-Release of Property.-Where in an attachment
suit in the superior court defendant's attached bank account
would have been sufficient to satisfy plaintiff's demand, the
court ordered a partial release, which order did not contain
any direction to the sheriff and was not entered in the permanent minutes until a week after its date, the county clerk 4
days after its entry issued his certificate reciting that notice
[1] See Cal.Jur., Process, Notices and Papers, § 1; Am.Jur.,
Process, § 2.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 17 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Sheriffs, Police and Constables, § 37 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur., Sheriffs and Constables, § 13; Am.Jur., Sheriffs,
Police and Constables, § 46 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Process,§ 1; [2] Sheriffs,§ 15; [3]
Sheriffs, § 12; [ 4, 10] Sheriffs, § 18;
Sheriffs, §§ 1, 12; [ 6]
Sheriffs, § 16; [7] Records, § 43; [8] Attachment, § 75; [9] Attachment, § 55.
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release order was served upon plaintiff's ataftpr its date and that no bond eontinuing lien
within 5
of the date of said order, and that
elapsed from the date of its service, but
the date of entry in the permanent minutes,
in reliance on the certificate sent to the bank
his partial relPase order·~while plaintiff had appealed and
timely filed an undertaking to continue the entire attachment
in force in compliance with Code Civ. Proc., § 946~the
sheriff's conduct was not as a matter of law a breach of an
absolute
rather, presents a question of mixed law and
fact as to whether the standard of diligence required of
sheriffs in the exigency of the case was observed, i.e., a que~>
tion of negligence.
[5] !d.-Nature of Office: Service of Process.-A sheriff is a ministerial officer, not a judicial one, and is justified in executing
all process and orders regnlar on their face and executed by
competent authority, whatever may be the defect in the proceedings on which they were issued. (Code Civ. Proc., § 262.1.)
[6] Id.-Liabilities.-Unless there is a clear absence of jurisdiction on the part of the court issuing process, it is sufficient
to protect a sheriff if on the face of the process it appears to
be valid in the judgment of an ordinarily intelligent and informed layman.
[7] Records-Effect as Evidence.-It is a part of the duties of
a clerk of court (Gov. Code, §§ 26800, 26803, 26831-26833;
Code Civ. Proc., §§ 153, subd. 5, 1892, 1893, 1904, 1905) to make
and certify copies of the records and papers in his keeping,
and where such duty is imposed on him by law his certificate
may be accepted as conclusive of the facts recited therein.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1893.)
[8] Attachment-Release of Attachment-Duty of Sheriff.-The
sheriff is bound to respect and carry out the court's order releasing an attachment which has been levied by him, although
the order for release is not specifically directed to him, when
a duly authenticated copy is placed in his hands (if he is entitled to rely on it at all) just as he is bound where the order
is specifically addressed to him.
[9] !d.-Proceedings in Principal Action-Appeal-Stay Pending
AppeaL-An appeal does not continue an attachment in force
unless it is perfected within five days after written notice of
the entry of the order appealed from. (Code Civ. Proc., § 946.)
[10] Sheriffs-Liability-Release of Property.-The sheriff was
justified in ordering a garnishee bank to release defendant's
funds held by it, or, at most, a question of his negligence as
distinguished from an absolute breach of official duty is presented, where he relied on the county clerk's certificate to the

notice served
order"
from
effect of
further statement in such certifithe order had
lien has been filed . . . within
cate that "no Bond ,_,vuc"cuu
support the
of the date
said
conclusion that the order had become final.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
County. I1ouis H. Burke, Judge. Affirmed.

.nL'"''"''v"

Action to recover from sheriff, his deputies and their sureties a sum of money alleged to have been lost by reason of
breach of duty by defendant officers acting in their official
capacity. Judgment for defendants affirmed.
Philip T. Lyons and Leroy B. Lorenz for Appellant.
Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Shuman & Clark, J. F.
Shuman and Scott L. Harrington as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), William E. Lamoreaux, Assistant County Counsel, Crider, Tilson
& Ruppe, Donald E. Ruppe, Sims & Wallbert and James H.
Sims for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment, rendered by the court sitting without a jury, in its
action to recover from defendant sheriff of Los Angeles
County, two of his deputies, 1 and the sureties upon their
respective bonds, a sum of money which plaintiff claims to
have lost by reason of an alleged breach of duty by the defendant officers acting in their official capacity.
Plaintiff contends that the sheriff, acting through his
deputies, wrongfully ordered the Bank of America, hereinafter referred to as the bank, to release from attachment
certain funds held by the bank, and that the bank complied
1
The complaint names both J. D. Brady and C. G. Traughber as deputy
sheriffs; the action appears to haYe been dismissed as to Deputy Traughber before trial.
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obtained
upon asserted breach
absolute in
from which breach lia~
matter of law. We have ~v""'-"'LlU
for reasons hereinafter
that the sheriff was not guilty
of breach of absolute
in
release of the funds
and so, upon
is not liable for any loss which
resulted
and that the
should be affirmed.
Plaintiff had brought an action
recovery of a
money
Construction Products Corporation,
hereinafter sometimes termed the corporation. A writ of
attachment was issued in that action and levied by defendant
sheriff upon the account of the corporation in the bank. The
bank reported to the sheriff that it held in the account
$6,858.14.
The following chronology of events then occurred:
June 1, 1951: Upon motion of the corporation, the superior
court ordered a release of the attachment as to all moneys
held by the bank and owing to the corporation in excess of
$2,000.
minutes of the court do not expressly state
whether a formal
and signed order was, was not, or
was to be, filed. See rule 2 (b), Rules on Appeal.)
,June 8, 1951: The above described order was entered m
the permanent minutes of the court.
,June 11, 1951: Plaintiff appealed from the above mentioned order and filed an undertaking to continue the attachment in force pending the appeal. (This was timely, within
five days after entry of the order, in compliance with section
946 of the Code of Civil Procedure.)
June 12, 1951: The clerk of the superior court issued the
following certificate:
''I, HAROLD J.
County Clerk and Clerk of the
Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the
County of Los Angeles, do hereby certify:
"That the Court, in Department 35 thereof, on June 1,
1951, ordered:
'' ' . . . Jl,fotion of Defendant to Discharge, Dissolve andjor
reduce in amount \Vrit of Attachment come on for hearing;
[listing'
. . . . Motion to dissolve attachment is
granted in part; Attachment released as to all property ex-
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cept $2,000.00 in bank account with [particular branch of
Bank of America].'
"That Notice of said Order was Berved upon [attorneys for
plaintiff] on June 4, 1951 ;
''That no Bond Continuing lien has been filed in this
action within 5 days of the date of said order, and that more
than 5 clays have elapsed from the date of service of said
Order;
"IN WITNEss WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and
affixed the Seal of said Superior Court this 12th day of June,
1951.
"HAROLD J. OsTLY, . . . By [signed] H. J. Wilson Deputy.
[Seal of Court.] ''
June 12, 1951: Also on this elate the sheriff, in reliance
upon the clerk's above set forth certificate, sent the following
''order to release'' to the bank:
" [Official letterhead of the sheriff's office. Name of case.
Addressed to Bank of America, particular branch involved.]
You are hereby notified that I have this day released the
following described personal property held by you, and attached by virtue of writ(s) issued in the above entitled action,
to-wit: All monies over and above the sum of $2,000.00.
"E. W. BrscAILUZ, Sheriff
By [signed] J. D. Brady
Deputy Sheriff."
Upon receipt of this release the bank permitted the attachment debtor to withdraw from its account all moneys in excess of $2,000. Subsequently, the attaching creditor (plaintiff)
obtained a reversal of the order partially releasing the attachment, and thereafter recovered a judgment of approximately $5,000 against Construction Products Corporation.
Under the writ of execution on this judgment the sheriff collected $2,000 from the bank but advised plaintiff that he had
released all funds iu excess of that sum. In the meantime the
debtor had become bankrupt.
Plaintiff then filed the present action against the sheriff,
his deputies, and the sureties upon their respective bonds,
to recover the unsatisfied portion of the judgment. As above
indicated, the court entered judgment in favor of all defendants, and this appeal followed. The controlling question is
the nature of the sheriff's duty in the premises. Is it absolute or may it be satisfied by due diligence 1 We conclude
that it is not absolute and, hence, may be satisfied by due
diligence.
The following cluHes are specifically enjoined on the sheriff:
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He ''shall attend all superior courts held within his county
and obey all lawful orders and directions of all courts held
within his county" (Gov. Code, § 26603) and he "shall serve
all process and notices in the manner prescribed by law"
(Gov. Code, § 26608.) [1] As used in reference to the duties
of the sheriff, " 'Process' includes all writs, warrants, summons, and orders of courts of justice, or judicial officers.''
(Gov. Code, § 26660; italics added.) The order of the court
purporting to release the attachment "as to all property except $2,000.00 in bank account" comes within the definition
of ''process'' above quoted.
[2] As a general rule ''A sheriff assuming to act virtute
officii warrants that he is possessed of such authority, and
if not authorized, is liable to persons who have suffered
damage from steps taken under the belief that he was." (47
Am.Jur. 848, § 37; see also, id. 855, § 46.) [3] In respect
to attachment levies it has been held in California that ''The
Sheriff's liability rests on his breach of official duty. As he
is bound to perform his duty, so is he responsible to every
one who may be injured by his failure to discharge it. In
respect to the execution of process these official duties are
well defined by law. The law is reasonable in this, as in all
other things. It holds public officers to a strict performance
of their respective duties. It tolerates no wanton disregard of
these duties. It sanctions no negligence; but it requires no
impossibilities and imposes no unconscionable exactions. When
process of attachment or execution comes to the hands of the
Sheriff, he must obey the exigency of the writ . . . But he
is not held to the duty of starting on the instant after receiving a writ, to execute it, without regard to anything else
than its instant execution. Reasonable diligence is all that
is required of him in such instances. But this reasonable
diligence depends upon the particular facts in connection with
the duty. [Italics added.] . . . We have seen that the Sheriff
is not absolutely responsible for not executing process of this
sort. He is responsible for unreasonably and not reasonably
executing such process." (Whitney v. Butterfield (1859),
13 Cal. 335, 338, 340 [73 Am.Dec. 584); see alRo Ayres v.
Burr (1901), 132 Cal. 125, 130 r64 P. 1201; Sheehy v. Graves
(1881), 58 Cal. 449, 455.) While the statements above quoted
were made in relation to the failure of the sheriff to originally levy an attachment in time to secure sufficient of the
defendants' property to satisfy plaintiffs' claim because a
writ subsequently issued in the action of another creditor
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tion of ""'"'''' ,_,,,
the cases hereinafter discussed.
[5] It is established that a sheriff
ministerial
not a judicial one Vallindras
"Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co.
(1954), 42 CaL2d
154
P.2d
), and is
in executing ''all process and orders
on their face and
issued by
whatever may be the defect in
the proceedings upon which
were issued." (Code Civ.
Proc., § 262.1.) [6] "In
whether process and
orders are 'regular on their face' so far as the
of such
an officer is concerned, the following statement from Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Blumenthal (1943), 128 Con
553
A.2d
751], is pertinent: 'When we speak of process "valid on its
face,'' in considering whether it is sufficient to protect an
officer, we do not mean that its validity is to be determined
upon the basis of scrutiny by a trained legal mind; nor is it to
be judged in light of facts outside its provisions which the
officer may know. [Citations.] Unless there is a clear absence of jurisdiction it is sufficient if upon its face it appears
to be valid in the judgment of an ordinarily intelligent and informed layman. To hold otherwise would mean that an
officer must often act at his peril or delay until he has had
an opportunity to search out legal niceties of procedure, and
... ''a result subjecting him to constant danger of liability
would be an intolerable hardship to him, and inevitably detract from the prompt and efficient performance of his public
duty."'" (Vallindms v. lJ!lassach1tsctts etc. Ins. Co. (1954),
supra, 42 Cal.2d 149, 154 [7].)
The sheriff here relied on a certificate of the clerk of court
which appeared complete and regular on its face, to the effect
that by order of the court the attachment was partially disand informed laysolved and (to an "ordinarily
man") that the order dissolving and releasing it in part was
final. [7] It is a part of the clerk's duties
Gov. Code,
§§ 26800, 26803, 2G831,
; Code Civ.
153,
subd. 5, 1892,
of the records and papers
duty is imposed on him by
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attachment. Pursuant to this
of the time for appeal,
faith surrendered the money to the
made no attempt to
the order
from a
determining title
to be in a third person. Regardless of appelin the latter
the marshal was held
before the appeal period had expired,
where he acted
reliance on the court's order which was
valid
face.
In Pirst Nat. Bank
(1931), 112 Cal.App. 665
P.
,
recovered judgment, notice of appeal
but no bond staying execution was provided. Execution was issued and levied by the sheriff. 'I'he judgment
debtor then filed a bond for the purpose of staying execution,
and the
that the defendant had filed a "good
'' ordered the sheriff to return the propdebtor. The sheriff promptly returned
The next
the plaintiff filed notice exsnreties on the stay bond, and the sureties
so the court ordered the sheriff to proceed
execution. But the sheriff was
unable to recover the property he had released, and the
plaintiff sued the sheriff for the resultant loss. The court
stated
669-671 of 112
) : "Even when this
bond to
exeeution has been filed, t:1e sheriff is not authorized to release
in his possession upon which he
has
levied an execution unless the judgment creditor
fails for a period of five
after the filing thereof to object
of the sureties thereon. . . .
to the
"Pursuant to the statute last quoted [Code Civ. Proc.,
§
it is
the foregoing order of the court directing
the sheriff to return the property to the judgment debtor
was premature and unauthorized. But the court did have
jurisdiction of the subject matter. . . . Although the order

LuMBER & INv. Co. v. BrscAILuz
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erroneous
of the law and an
it nevertheless furnishes a comfor the sheriff to return the property since
appears upon the face of the
no evidE~1ce of its
order. . . . \Vhen the order or process appears to be regular
and valid upon its
and to have been executed by competent
authority, it is
of a sheriff to execute it . . . . The
sheriff may limit his
to an inspection of the writ....
''In the
case the sheriff appears to have acted
in perfect
faith. Since the order of the court stated
that 'a
and sufficient bond . . . to stay the writ of
execution,' had been filed, and since the order fails to state
when the undertaking was filed, the sheriff was justified in
assuming that the bond conformed in every way to the requirements of the law, and that the five days allowed by
statute for
to the sufficiency of the sureties had
elapsed. 'fhe order also specifically directed the sheriff 'to
return any and all property to the judgment debtor which
he may have in his custody.' This order was valid on its
face. The sheriff is a mere ministerial officer. He is not
required, at his peril, to search the records to dispute specific
statements which are recited in a court order directing him to
perform a ministerial duty.''
The language quoted from the last two cases is persuasive. It is true that in those cases the court specifically
ordered the sheriff to release the property, while here the
court ordered the release of the attachment in part but gave
no orders directed to the sheriff. However, as has been hereinabove indicated, the sheriff is the officer who is charged
with the duty of executing such orders; i.e., he levies and
releases attachments and executions, serves all "process" of
the court placed in his hands, and returns to the court an
account of his actions. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 539a, 540,
542, 543, 546, 554, 556, 558, 682, 682a, 946; Gov. Code,
§§ 26608, 26609.) [8] The sheriff would be bound to respect
and carry out the court's order releasing the attachment when
a duly authenticated copy was placed in his hands (if he was
entitled to rely on it at all) just as he is bound where the
order is specifically addressed to him. (See Clark v. Superior
Cont·t (1918), 37 Cal.App. 732, 734 [174 P. 681] .)
[9] An appeal does not continue an attachment in force
unless it is perfected within five days after written notice of
the entry of the order appealed from. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 946.) [10] The certificate of the clerk in this case stated
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that "Notice of said Order [releasing the attachment in part]
was served upon" the
for plaintiff, and tl1at "more
than 5 days have elapsed from the date of service of said
Order." It could reasonably have been belieYed
the sheriff
that the notice served was the "written notiee of the
of the order'' provided for by section 946 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and that the time for effeetive appeal from
the order had passed. The further statement
the certificate
that "no Bond Continuing lien has been
.. within 5
days of the date of said order" would further support the
conclusion that the order had become finaL
First Nat.
Bank v. M.cOoy (1931), supra, 112 Cal.App. 665, 671.)
For the reasons above stated, we conclude that the sheriff
was justified as a matter of law in ordering the release,
or that, at the most, there is presented a question of negligence
(a question of mixed law and fact as to the exercise of due
diligence in the performance of official duty) and that in
either event this appeal must result in affirmance. 2
Other questions are argued or suggested by the parties
but for reasons indicated need not be resolved. Inasmuch
as the bank is not a party to the aetion we need not consider whether the bank was justified in relying on the sheriff's
release or whether as against the bank the sheriff would be
estopped to deny his authority to release the funds. 3 (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 1962, par. 3; DavenJJOTt v. StTatton (1944),
24 Cal.2d 232,243 [6] [149 P.2d 4].) For a similar reasonthe county clerk not having been made a party-it is not
necessary to consider whether liability should devolve upon
the clerk for issuing a certifieate whieh, although perhaps
accurate in all that it did state, stated only part of the pertinent faets when the records of the elerk disclosed other faets
whieh had a material bearing on the matter to whieh the
eertifieate related (i.e., that the order was entered in the
permanent minutes on June 8, 1951, and that a notiee of
2
Plaintiff in its brief expressly disclaims reliance on any theory of
negligence; it says, ''Nowhere in the pleadings or the evidence in this
case is there any mention of any negligence or any aet which, in itself,
would constitute negligence . . . As heretofore indicated, negligence is
not involved in this case, by either pleading or evidence . . . ''
"The sheriff, through his deputy, sent an "order to release" to the
bank, on an official form used for the specillc
of releasing garnishments, pursuant to what had been a
practice. It
appears that the sheriff expected and intended
the hank should rely
and act on the order to release and change its position, as it did.

concurred.

concludes that
imposed upon the sheriff
his
was
no breach of official
the
of his
unauthorized order
the
account. It is
submitted that this conclusion is erroneous and without sup-·
port in the authorities cited in the
First, the cases which are cited for the
that
a sheriff is justified in
upon a court order if the
latter is "valid on its face" have no
under the instant
circumstances. In each of those cases, the officer involved
acted under a court order which
directed him
to act. In Vallinclras v. Massachusetts etc. Ins.
42 Cal.2d
149 [265 P.2d 907], the court issued an order directing the
sheriff to imprison Vallindras for eontempt. The order was
later determined to be erroneous and Vallindras sought reRecovery
covery from the shrriff for false
was denied on the ground that the sheriff was entitled to
rely upon an
on its face and issued
competent
authority, without
an
as
possible
defects in the
rise to the order. In O'Br•ien
v. Thomas, 21 CaLApp.2d
765
P.2d 1370], the
court ordered the marshal to release money held under an
attachment. The marshal released the money without awaiting expiration of the time for
It was held that he
was justified in relying npon the court order. In First Nat.
Bank v. McCoy, 1]2
665
P.
, the court
ordered the sheriff to return attached
to the defendant after the latter had filed a stay bond. The sheriff
returned the property before the time in >vhich plaintiff had
to except to the sureties on the bond had
Thereafter, the sureties failed to
'l'he
justified
the .court order
was no order
the sheriff
account, hence, there was no compulsion upon the sheriff to
act as in the cited eases. In each of those eases, if the court
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sheriff
section
an process
and Code of
that: "A
and shall execute,
orders
face and issued by
whateyer may be the defect in the proupon which
were issued'' cannot justify the
action of the
here for the reason that the court order
did not call for ''service'' or ''execution''
the sheriff.
it did not direct the sheriff to take action.
As
Neither
into play any code section requiring
the sheriff to act. In this latter respect the instant case
<liffers from Clark v.
37 Oal.App. 732 [174
P. (181], cited
the
for the proposition that: "The
sheriff would be bound
and carry out the court's
order :releasing the attachment when a duly authenticated
copy was
in his hands ... just as he is bound where
the order is
addressed to him." In the Clark
case, the sheriff refused to release on the record an attachment of real
after the trial court ordered a nonsuit
and the
failed to
within the prescribed time.
It was held that the sheriff could be compelled, by a writ of
to release the attachment because of a code section
§ 4157 subd. 7, now Gov. Oodc, § 26606) which
declares tllat: "'rhc sheriff shall release on the record all
attachments of real
when the attachment placed in
his hand l1as been released or discharged." (Emphasis added.)
rrherc is no
however, requiring the sheriff
of a garnishment (Johnston v. Jones,
to order the
P.
) , therefore, the statement in
that the sheriff m this ease was bound
to carry out the court's order
the attachment is
the general rule quoted
("A sheriff assuming to act virtute
officii warrants that he is
of such authority, and if
not auth01·ized, is liable to persons vvho have suffered damage
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belief that he was''), the plaintiff
from the sheriff and his deputy for the
loss occasioned
their unauthorized conduct. This conelusion is further supported by the ease law in this state to
the effect that a sheriff who releases attached property without
commits a breach of his duty and is responsible
for the resultant loss. (Sanfm·d v. Boring,
to the
12 CaL
; Hesser v. Rowley, 139 CaL 410, 413 [73 P.
138 Cal.App.2d 586, 592 [292 P.2d
these cases dealt with the wrongful release
in the sheriff's custody, the principles
therein would apply to the wrongful release of
garnisheed property.
The indication in the majority opinion that the only possible
basis of liability is that of negligence (which theory plaintiff
expressly disclaimed) is likewise without support. This question arose in Reynolds v. Lerman, supm, 138 Cal.App.2d 586,
in connection with the applicability of Government Code section 1981 which requires the filing of a claim as a prerequisite
to the maintenance of an action for the negligence of a public
officer. In that case the sheriff had attached certain personal
property and, without authority, sold it for storage charges.
'rhe owner sued the sheriff for damages for failure to ''safely
keep" the property. The contention that this amounted to
a charge of negligence by the sheriff requiring the filing of
a claim was rejected. The court held that it was not a
question of: the "safety" of the keeping bnt of a violation of
the plaintiff's right to have the sheriff "keep" the property
and that the unauthorized violation of this duty amounted to
conversion, an intentional, not a neg·ligent tort. Similarly,
the unauthorized release of the attached funds was intentional,
not negligent. In Sarafini v. City & County of San Francisco,
143 Cal.App.2d 570, 574-575 [300 P.2d 44], the plaintiff sued
police officers who, acting upon erroneous information, had
broken into her apartment. It was held that the claim statute
was inapplicable because the act was deliberate although it
was based upon the negligent belief that illegal activities
were being conducted in the apartment. Here, defendant
Brady's conduct in ordering the release was a deliberate,
voluntary act although he apparently acted under the negligently acquired belief that the release was authorized. Accordingly, relief: should not be denied on the ground that his
conduct >vas merely negligent.
Further arguments of the defendants, referred to in the
from
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majority opinion, are likewise without merit. Inasmuch as
the court order, even as it
on the clerk's certificate,
did not require any action by the sheriff,
force of the order
or of any statute, the
of the liability to the clerk
for issuing an incomplete certificate is irrelevant. As to the
argument that the bank was not justified
upon the
purported release
it suffices to say that such a result
would east a burden upon the
to continuously examine the myriad court records to ascertain
effectiveness
of any attachments upon
held by him. To conclude
that the garnishee may not rely upon an
served by an
officer of the court, could only result in confusion of the heretofore workable practiees
the release of attaehments.
For the reason that the release order was unjustified by
either court order or statute, I am of the opinion that the
sheriff is liable for the loss
from his
breach
of official duty and, accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.

[S. F. No. 19552.

In Bank.

Jan. 25, 1957.]

INGA A. BRANDELIUS et al., Appellants, v. CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al., Respondents.
[1] New Trial-Discretion-Review.·-The granting of a motion
for new trial rests so completely within the discretion of
the trial court that its action will not be disturbed unless a
manifest and unmistakable ahuse of discretion clearly appears.
[2] Appeal-Presumptions-Orders on Motion for New TriaL-On
appeal all presumptions are in favor of an order granting new
trial.
[3] !d.-Grounds of Decision Below-Order Granting New TriaLAn order granting new trial will be affirmed if it may be sustained on any ground, although the reviewing court might have
ruled differently in the first instance.
[1] See Cal.Jur., New Trial, § 13; Am.Jur., New Trial, §§ 201,
202.
McK. Dig. References: [1] New Trial, § 12(3); [2] Appeal and
Error, §1197; [3] Appeal and Error §1014; [4] Carriers, §61;
[5] Carriers, §140; [6] Carriers, §141; [7] Death, §42; [8, 10-15]
Negligence,§ 48; [9, 16, 17] Negligence,§ 217;
19] New Trial,
§ 124; [20] Carriers, § 147.

